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Abstract
We investigate the effect of multimarket contacts on the privatization policy in
mixed duopoly with price competition. There are two markets, one of which is
served solely by the state-owned public firm, and the other is served by both public
and private firms. Two markets are linked by the production technology of the
public firm. In the general model, we first show that privatization is never optimal
in the absence of multimarket contacts, i.e., if there is only one monopoly market
or one duopoly market. Then, using a linear-quadratic specification, we show that
a positive degree of privatization can be optimal in the presence of multimarket
contacts. This result has an implication for the privatization policy in universal
service sectors.
JEL classification H42, L33
Keywords Multimarket contacts, partial privatization, state-owned public enterprise
1 Introduction
Since the early 1980s, we have observed a worldwide wave of the privatization of state-
owned public enterprises. Nevertheless, many public and semi-public enterprises (i.e.,
firms owned by both public and private sectors) are still active in planned and market
economies in developed, developing, and transitional countries. While some public enterprises
∗Graduate School of Economics, The University of Tokyo, Email:taku121281@gmail.com
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are traditional monopolists in natural monopoly markets, a considerable number of public
(including semi-public) enterprises compete with private enterprises in a wide range of
industries.1 Optimal privatization policies in such mixed oligopolies have attracted extensive
attention from economics researchers in such fields as industrial organization, public
economics, financial economics, international economics, development economics, and
political economy.2
Specifically, drawing on the result of Matsumura (1998) that full nationalization is
never optimal in Cournot mixed duopoly, many studies on mixed oligopolies investigate
how economic environments affect the optimal degree of privatization.3 In this way, most
studies of privatization policies in mixed oligopoly use quantity competition model to
characterize the optimal privatization policies. However, there are many applications
where it is more plausible to assume that firms compete in prices.4 In addition, as shown
by Matsumura and Ogawa (2012), when public and private enterprises can choose whether
to compete in price or quantity, they choose to compete in price in the equilibrium.
Therefore, discussing the optimal privatization policies under price competition is also
important in both practical and theoretical perspectives. That said, there is a conventional
wisdom in the literature of mixed oligopoly that the privatization policy, as an device
to change the public firm’s objective toward profit maximization, does not improve the
welfare. The reason is that the privatization increases the public firm’s price, and it also
increases the price of private firms through the strategic interaction, both of which harm
welfare.
We argue that this reasoning holds only if firms compete in a single market. If the
public firm provides in multiple markets, the result changes. To show this, we consider a
variation of model of Kawasaki and Naito (2017). There are two markets, one of which
is served solely by the state-owned public firm, and the other is served by both public
and private firms. Two markets are linked by the production cost of public firm. In
this environment, we show that a positive degree of privatization can be optimal in the
presence of multimarket contacts. As we explain in Section 3, this comes from the intra-
1Examples include United States Postal Service, Deutsche Post AG, Areva, Nippon Telecom and
Telecommunication, Japan Tobacco, Volkswagen, Renault, E´lectricite´ de France, Japan Postal Bank,
Kampo, Korea Development Bank, and Korea Investment Corporation.
2The idea of mixed oligopoly dates at least to Merrill and Schneider (1966). Recently, the literature
on mixed oligopoly has become richer and more diverse. For examples of mixed oligopolies and recent
developments in this field, see Ishibashi and Matsumura (2006), Ishida and Matsushima (2009), Colombo
(2016), Chen (2017), Matsumura and Sunada (2013), and the papers cited therein.
3For example, see Lin and Matsumura, (2012) for the share of foreign investors who purchases the
stock of public firm, Matsumura and Kanda (2005) for free entry, and Sato and Matsumura (2017) shadow
cost of public funds
4For the anslyses of price competition in mixed oligopolies, see Ba´rcena-Ruiz, J. C. (2007), Matsumura.
T. (2012), Cremer et al.(1991), and Andersion et al. (1997) for examples.
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firm production substitution of public firm. An increase in the degree of privatization
decreases the production of public firm in monopoly market. This decreases the marginal
cost of production for the duopoly market, which raises the incentive to increase the
production. When the degree of product differentiation between public and private firms
are small, the latter effect tends to dominate the unilateral effect of privatization to
decrease the production in duopoly market. Under the price competition, this decreases
the equilibrium price of private firm through the strategic interaction. This improves the
welfare. This is the reason why partial privatization can be optimal in the presence of
multimarket contacts.
This result sheds light on an important aspect of privatization policy in mixed oligopoly.
For example, in transportation industries, there are several situations where the public
firm provides its services in both rural and urban areas probably due to universal service
reasons, while private firms only provide services in urban areas. In such a situation,
privatization of the public firm can stimulate the competition in urban area through the
improved production efficiency of the public firm.
2 Model
Consider a model of multimarket mixed price competition. There are a state-owned public
firm, firm 0, and a private firm, firm 1. There are two markets A and B. Market A is
solely provided by firm 0, while market B is provided by both firm 0 and firm 1. This
means that the public firm serves two markets, in one of which it competes with the
private firm.
The representative consumer in market A is characterized by its relative size φ ∈ [0, 1]
and the utility function UA(xA0 ) + y
A, where xA0 is the amount of the consumption of the
products provided by firm 0 and yA is the consumption of the composite goods. The
representative consumer in market B is characterized by its relative size (1− φ) and the
utility function UB(xB0 , x
B
1 ) + y
B, where xB0 and x
B
1 are the amount of the consumption of
the products provided by firm 0 and firm 1, and yB is the consumption of the composite
goods. Assuming that the representative consumer in each market has enough income
and UA and UB are concave, its consumption is derived from the first-order conditions
∂UA
∂xA0
= pA0 ,
∂UB
∂xB0
= pB0 , and
∂UB
∂xB1
= pB1 , (1)
where pA0 , p
B
0 , and p
B
1 are prices of products. We denote D
A(pA0 ), D
B
0 (p
B
0 , p
B
1 ), and
DB0 (p
B
0 , p
B
1 ) as the demand functions and CS
A(pA0 ) and CS
B(pB0 , p
B
1 ) as the consumer
3
surpluses. Note that, by the envelope theorem, ∂CSA/∂pA0 = −DA0 and ∂CSB/∂pBi =
−DBi , i = 0, 1 hold.
We assume that the products in market B are substitutes, i.e., ∂DBi /∂p
B
j < 0 for i 6= j.
We also assume that the demands are symmetric, that is, DB0 (x, x) = D
B
1 (x, x). Further,
we assume that the demand functions satisfy the following regularity condition
∂DBi
∂pBi
+
∂DBi
∂pBj
< 0 for i = 0, 1, j 6= i. (2)
This condition means that if the prices of both firms simultaneously increase, the demands
for both products decrease, which is natural to assume in many applications.
The production technologies of firms are given by cost functions C0(q
A
0 , q
B
0 ) and C1(q
B
0 ).
Then, the profit of each firm is given by
Π0(p
A
0 , p
B
0 , p
B
1 ) = φD
A(pA0 )p
A
0 + (1− φ)DB0 (pB0 , pB1 )pB0 − C0(φDA(pA0 ), (1− φ)DB0 (pB0 , pB1 )),
(3)
and
Π1(p
B
0 , p
B
1 ) = (1− φ)DB0 (pB0 , pB1 )− C1((1− φ)DB0 (pB0 , pB1 )). (4)
Social welfare SW is given by
SW = φCSA(pA0 ) + (1− φ)CSB(pB0 , pB1 ) + Π0(pA0 , pB0 , pB1 ) + Π1(pB0 , pB1 ). (5)
Firm 0 maximizes the weighted average of its own profit and social welfare
Ω = αΠ0 + (1− α)SW, (6)
where α ∈ [0, 1] is the degree of privatization.
3 Equilibrium
We adopt subgame-perfect equilibrium as the solution and solve the model by backward
induction. In the market stage, the first-order conditions for firm 0 are given by5
∂Ω
∂pA0
= α
(
∂DA0
∂pA0
(
pA0 −
∂C0
∂qA0
)
+DA0
)
+ (1− α)∂D
A
0
∂pA0
(
pA0 −
∂C0
∂qA0
)
= 0,
∂Ω
∂pB0
= α
(
∂DB0
∂pB0
(
pB0 −
∂C0
∂qB0
)
+DB0
)
+ (1− α)
(
∂DB0
∂pB0
(
pB0 −
∂C0
∂qB0
)
+
∂DB1
∂pB0
(
pB1 −
∂C1
∂qB1
))
= 0,
(7)
5In the model of price competition with quadratic costs, firms may have incentives to serve the all the
amount demanded. We ignore such possibilities in this model since as shown by Matsumura (2012), if
the public firm faces the universal service obligation, there are no such incentives.
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and the first-order condition for firm 1 is given by
∂DB1
∂pB1
(
pB1 −
∂C1
∂qB1
)
+DB1 = 0. (8)
We assume that the second-order conditions are satisfied, i.e., the Hessian matrix of Ω is
negative definite, and ∂2Π1/∂p
B
1 < 0. We also assume that the strategy of firm 1 exhibits
strategic complementarity, that is,
∂DB1
∂pB0
(
1− ∂D
B
1
∂pB1
∂2C1
∂qB1
2
)
+
∂2DB1
∂pB1 ∂p
B
0
(
pB1 −
∂C1
∂qB1
)
> 0. (9)
A sufficient condition for the strategic complementarity is that ∂2DB1 /(∂p
B
1 ∂p
B
0 ) ≥ 0 and
C1 being weakly convex.
Further, to guarantee the uniqueness and the stability of the equilibrium, we put the
following restriction. Let RA0 (p
B
1 ) and R
B
0 (p
B
1 ) be the best-response functions of firm 0
and RB1 (p
B
0 ) be the best-response function of firm 1. We assume that |∂RA0 /∂pB1 | < 1,
|∂RB0 /∂pB1 | < 1, and |∂RB1 /∂pB0 | < 1.
Let pA0 (α), p
B
0 (α), and p
B
1 (α) be the equilibrium prices given α.
Next, in the privatization stage the government chooses α ∈ [0, 1] to maximize SW .
Let α∗ be the welfare-maximizing value of α. In the case of interior solution, the first-order
condition is given by
dSW
dα
∣∣∣∣
α=α∗
=
dpA0
dα
φ
∂DA0
∂pA0
(
pA0 −
∂C0
∂qA0
)
+ (1− φ)dp
B
0
dα
(
∂DB0
∂pB0
(
pB0 −
∂C0
∂qB0
)
+
∂DB1
∂pB0
(
pB1 −
∂C1
∂qB1
))
+
dpB1
dα
(1− φ)
(
∂DB0
∂pB1
(
pB0 −
∂C0
∂qB0
)
+
∂DB1
∂pB1
(
pB1 −
∂C1
∂qB1
))
= 0.
(10)
We assume that the second-order condition is satisfied. In the case of corner solution, we
have either (dSW/dα)|α=0 ≤ 0 or (dSW/dα)|α=1 ≥ 0.
As a conventional wisdom, in the public monopoly or mixed oligopoly with price
competition, positive degree of privatization would never be optimal. The following lemma
and proposition formalize this conventional wisdom.
Lemma 1 If φ = 0, dpB0 (0)/dα > 0 and dp
B
1 (0)/dα > 0.
Proof : See Appendix.
Proposition 1 If φ = 0 or φ = 1, full nationalization is optimal.
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Proof : See Appendix.
The reason for the above result is that an increase in the degree of privatization from full
nationalization increases the public firm’s price since it leans to its own profit, which also
increases the price of private firms through the strategic interaction. The former change
has negligible effect on the welfare since the public firm is welfare maximizer (envelope
theorem), but the latter harms the welfare.
4 Partial Privatization with Multimarket Contact
In this section, we show that the result drastically changes when we take multimarket
contacts into account. In order to maintain tractability in analyzing multimarket situation,
we restrict our attention to quadratic utility and cost functions. Specifically, we assume
that UA(xA0 ) = x
A
0 − (xA0 )2/2, UB(xB0 , xB1 ) = xB0 + xB1 − ((xB0 )2 + 2γxB0 xB1 + (xB1 )2)/2 for
γ ∈ (0, 1), C0(qA0 , qB0 ) = (qA0 + qB0 )2/2, and C1(qB1 ) = (qB1 )2/2.6 Then we yield
Π1 = p
B
1 (1− φ)
(
1− γ − pB1 + γ ∗ pB0
1− γ2
)
− (1− φ)
2
2
(
1− γ − pB1 + γpB0
1− γ2
)2
, (11)
Πo =p
A
0 φ(1− pA0 ) + pB0 (1− φ)
(
1− γ − pB0 + γpB1
1− γ2
)
− 1
2
(
(1− φ)(1− γ − pB0 + γpB1 )
1− γ2 + φ(1− p)
)2
,
CSA =
(1− pA0 )2
2
, (12)
and
CSB =
pB0 2 + p
B
1 2 + 2(1− pB0 − pB1 )− 2γ(1− pB1 )(1− pB0 )
2(1− γ2) . (13)
In this specification, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 2 If φ ∈ (0, 1) then,
∃γ∗ s.t. ∀γ > γ∗ ∂p
B
1
∂α
∣∣∣∣
α=0
< 0 (14)
Proof : See Appendix.
The mechanism behind Lemma 2 is following. Departing from full nationalization to
partial privatization makes a public enterprise lean to own profit, and that basically pulls
6In this specification, all the assumptions put in the general model hold.
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up its prices in both markets. In a market solely supplied by the public firm especially,
it leads to less production. Because of the less production in the one market, the public
firm can have a room in its cost function to cut down the price in the other market.
This sequence ends up slicing off the competitor’s price through strategic complement
relationship. The last effect gets stronger as their products being similar, and beyond
some threshold it dominates the first pulling up effect.
Lemma 2 immediately yields our main proposition stating an optimality of the partial
privatization in price competition situation, which never be optimal without multimarket
contacts.
Proposition 2 If φ ∈ (0, 1) then for γ∗ defined in Lemma 2,
∀γ > γ∗ ∂SW
∂α
∣∣∣∣
α=0
> 0 (15)
Proof : Suppose that γ > γ∗.
∂SW
∂α
=
dpA0
dα
dSW
dpA0
+
dpB0
dα
dSW
dpB0
+
dpB1
dα
dSW
dpB1
(16)
At α = 0, the first and second term of the right hand side are zero from the envelope
theorem. The first factor of the third term is negative from Lemma 2, and the second
factor is negative as shown in the proof of Proposition 1 in the Appendix. Thus the
sign of the whole derivative is positive. Q.E.D.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have formally shown the conventional wisdom that under the price
competition, privatization of public enterprises never improves welfare if they serve to
a single market. Then we have shown that the partial privatization can be optimal if
the public firm faces multimarket contacts. These results shed lights on the importance
of taking multimarket interactions into account for the analysis of optimal privatization
policies. In addition, these results have policy implications for the privatization policy in
sectors such as transportation, in which public enterprises often solely serve to rural areas
and compete with private enterprises in urban areas.
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Appendix
Equilibrium Prices for Section 4
The equilibrium prices given α under the specification in Section 4 are as follows:
pA0 (α) =
1
δ
[α2
(
γ2 − 1) (φ− 3) + α (γ (γ (γ2 + γ(φ− 1) + (φ− 2)φ− 4)− φ+ 1)− 2φ+ 6)
+(γ − 1)γ ((γ2 − 2)φ+ γ)− 2γ − φ+ 3](17)
pB0 (α) =
1
δ
[α2(γ2 − 1)(2γ + φ− 3) + α(γ(γ(γ2 + 2γφ+ γ + (φ− 1)φ− 5)− φ− 2)− 2φ+ 6)
+γ((γ − 2)γ(γ + 1)(φ+ 1) + 2φ)− φ+ 3](18)
pB1 (α) =
(γ2 + φ− 2) (α2 (γ2 − 1) + α (γ2(φ+ 1) + γ − 3) + γ − 2)
δ
, (19)
where
δ ≡ α2 (γ2 − 1) (φ− 3) + α (γ4 + γ2 (φ2 − φ− 7)− 3φ+ 9)+ γ4(φ+ 1)− 2γ2(φ+ 2)− 2φ+ 6.(20)
Proof of Lemma 1
In the case where φ = 0, the equilibrium prices given α is characterized by ∂Ω/∂pB0 = 0
and ∂Π1/∂p
B
1 = 0. Using the implicit function theorem, we have
H
(
dpB0
dα
dpB1
dα
)
= −
(
DB0 − ∂D
B
1
∂pB0
(
pB1 − ∂C1∂qB1
)
0
)
(21)
where
H =
 ∂2Ω∂pB0 2 ∂2Ω∂pB0 ∂pB1
∂2Π1
∂pB1 ∂p
B
0
∂2Π1
∂pB1
2
 (22)
At α = 0, we have
DB0 −
∂DB1
∂pB0
(
pB1 −
∂C1
∂qB1
)
=DB0 +
∂DB1 /∂p
B
0
∂DB1 /∂p
B
1
DB1 > 0,
(23)
which follows from the regularity condition, pB0 < p
B
1 , and the symmetry of demand
function.
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Then, using Cramer’s rule, we have
dpB0
dα
∣∣∣∣
α=0
=
−
(
DB0 − ∂D
B
1 /∂p
B
0
∂DB0 /∂p
B
0
∂DB1 /∂p
B
0
∂DB1 /∂p
B
1
DB1
)
∂2Π1
∂pB1
2
detH
> 0
since
detH =
∂2Ω
∂pB0
2
∂2Π1
∂pB1
2 −
∂2Ω
∂pB0 ∂p
B
1
∂2Π1
∂pB1 ∂p
B
0
=
∂2Ω
∂pB0
2
∂2Π1
∂pB1
2
(
1− ∂R
B
0
∂pB1
∂RB1
∂pB0
)
> 0
(24)
from the stability condition.
Finally, the equation
∂2Π1
∂pB1 ∂p
B
0
dpB0
dα
+
∂2Π1
∂pB1
2
dpB1
dα
= 0
implies that dpB1 /dα > 0. This completes the proof. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1
For any φ ∈ [0, 1], we have
dSW
dα
∣∣∣∣
α=0
= (1− φ)dp
B
1
dα
1
∂DB0 /∂p
B
0
(
pB1 −
∂C1
∂qB1
)(
∂DB1
∂pB1
∂DB0
∂pB0
− ∂D
B
1
∂pB0
∂DB0
∂pB1
)
. (25)
When φ = 1, this equals zero, which implies α∗ = 0. When φ = 0, Lemma 1 implies
that dpB1 /dα|α=0 > 0. Since the term other than dpB1 /dα|α=0 > 0, say dSW/dpB1 , is
negative from the stability condition and the first-order condition of firm 1, we have
(dpB1 /dα|α=0)(dSW/dpB1 ) < 0. Thus, we have α∗ = 0 in both cases. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2
∂pB1
∂α
∣∣∣∣
α=0
=
γ(γ + 1) (γ2 + φ− 2) f(γ, φ)
(γ4(φ+ 1)− 2γ2(φ+ 2)− 2φ+ 6)2 (26)
where
f(γ, φ) ≡ γ4(φ+ 1)2 − γ3 (φ2 + φ+ 1)− γ2 (φ2 + 8φ+ 4)+ 7γ(φ+ 1) + φ− 3. (27)
Since γ, φ ∈ (0, 1), the sign of the derivative is the same as of f . We have f(0, φ) <
0, f(1, φ) > 0 and f(γ, φ) belongs to C∞ class. Then showing f(·, φ) has at most one
extremum in γ ∈ (0, 1) for any φ ∈ (0, 1) proves Lemma 2.7
7Suppose that f(·, φ) has at most one minimum or maximum. If the extremum is minimum at γ,
then fγ(γ, φ) < 0 for all γ < γ, since otherwise there is some point γ
′ ∈ (0, γ) such that fγ(γ′, φ) = 0,
contradicting the assumption that f(·, φ) has at most one extremum. Similarly, fγ(γ, φ) > 0 for all
γ ∈ (γ, 1). These imply that there exists γ∗ such that f(γ, φ) < 0 for any γ ∈ [0, γ∗), f(γ∗, φ) = 0, and
f(γ, φ) > 0 for any γ ∈ (γ∗, 1]. The case where the extremum is maximum is analogous.
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Let fγ(γ, φ) and fγγ(γ, φ) be the first and second partial derivatives with respect to γ.
Then,
fγ(γ, φ) = 4γ
3(1 + φ)2 − 3γ2(1 + φ+ φ2)− 2γ(4 + 8φ+ φ2) + 7(1 + φ) (28)
fγγ(γ, φ) = 12γ
2(1 + φ)2 − γ(1 + φ+ φ2)− 2(4 + 8φ+ φ2) . (29)
Since fγγ(0, φ) < 0 and fγγ is convex, fγ has at most one extremum. In addition to it,
fγ(0, φ) > 0 and fγ(1, φ) < 0 together show the solution of fγ(·, φ) = 0 with respect to γ
is unique, which implies so is the extremum of f(·). Q.E.D.
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